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ABSTRACT 
In recent years, spin-off is a common phenomenon in the Hong Kong stock market. Listed 
conglomerates such as Cheung Kong (Holdings) Limited and New World Development Company 
Limited have applied listing for their infrastructure businesses, mainly in the PRC, separately. The 
combination of infrastructure businesses, which is lacking in Hong Kong, and the PRC-based concept 
has made the newly listing vehicle very appealing to the investors and fund managers. The 
encouraging results have induced other listed companies to consider spin-off part oftheir business. We 
are quite interested in analysing this phenomenon and want to find out the reasons and also advantages 
for spin-off. . Apart from that, areas of interest including basis of pricing, cash flows implication, 
response ofIPO, subsequent share price performance etc. 
Cheung Kong Infrastructure Holdings Limited (CKI), the spun-off subsidiary of Cheung 
Kong (Holdings) (CKH) will be the primary targeted company under our analysis. Apart from fund 
raising and the other managerial incentives, our study finds out that spin-off can also solve the 
information asymmetry from the view of stakeholders. Thus, the share price performance o fCKH was 
directly improved as a consequence. However, the CKI's initial public offering (IPO) price 
(HK$12.65) was too demanding to induce public interests, therefore the share price of CKI was 
disappointing on debut when compared with the other newly red chips listed in the same period. 
On the flip side of a coin, spin-off also has its own negative impacts on both spun-off unit and the 
parent; thus management irm strive a balance before undergoing the spin-off process. 
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On July 17 1996, Cheung Kong (Holdings) Limited has spun-off its infrastructure-related 
businesses into a newly created listed company, Cheung Kong Infrastructure Holdings Limited (CKI). 
The combination ofChina concept and infrastructure businesses has made CKI stock very appealing to 
the investors. Approximately one year after the initial listing, CKI has became a new constituent stock 
ofthe Hang Seng Index. Its market capitalisation has increased from HK$17.9 billion to the historical 
high of HK$63.5 billion on August 6，1997 and now ranked 13th largest listed company in Hong 
Kong. Mr Victor Li Tzar-kuoi, the elder son of tycoon Mr Li Ka-shing, has tumed out to be the 
youngest CEO among the 33 constituent stocks. 
We would like to tliank Professor H 7hang for providing some valuable advice and guidance 




Before the Hong Kong stock market tumed lethargic amid of the recent Asian currency turmoil, 
an incessant steam of spin-offs have been announced or proposed by different locally listed companies. 
The word ‘spin-off refers to the corporate activity whereby a company lists out another special purpose 
vehicle by injecting a selected class of assets into it. 
Several research works have done to prove that spin-off is positive to both parents and spin-offs. 
A significant positive share price reaction is documented for 93 voluntary spin-off announcements between 
1963 and 1981. These shareholder gains do not appear to come wholly at the expense of bondholders. 
Evidence suggests the gains to shareholders may arise from tax and regulatory advantages and/or improved 
managerial efficiency resulting from the spin-off (Schipper & Smith, 1983). In the other article, 
significantly positive abnonnal returns for spin-offs wer^ observed when the parents and the spin-offs were 
in combinations. Both the spin-offs and parents experienc. an nnusually high incidence of takeovers and 
the abnormal performance is limited to 'irms involved in takeover prtivity. These findings suggest that 
spin-offs provide a low-cost method of transferrinp, control of corporate asscis to bidders who will create 
greater value (Cusatis, Miles & Woolridge，1993). Besides, spin-offs generate significani increases in real 
asset growth and cash flow margin on sales for combined firm measures (spun-off firm plus parent firm). 
The gain result from increases in real asset growth for parent and spun-offfirms, and improvements in cash 
flow margin on sales for parents. Spin-offs create value by improving investment incentives and economic 
performance (Johnson, Klein & Thibodeaux, 1996). 
However, another finding suggests that spin-off is not a panacea because evidences showed that 
positive gains for firms engaging in spin-offs to facilitate mergers or to separate diverse operating units but 
negative returns to firms responding to legal and/or regulatory difficulties. No evidence is found to 
indicate the gains to stockholders represent wealth transfers from senior security holders (Hite & Owers, 
1983). 
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Recently, a study proposes a managerial discretion hypothesis of equity carve-outs in which 
managers' values controls over assets and undertakes carve-outs only when the firm is capital constrained. 
Consistent with this hypothesis, firms that carve out subsidiaries exhibit poor operating performance and 
high leverage prior to carve-outs. Wherein funds raised are used to pay down debt, the average excess 
stock return is significantly greater than carve-outs wherein ftinds are retained for investment purposes 
(Allen & McConnelI, 1998). Although the topic of spin-off has been studied in the westem countries for 
years, papers focusing on Asian companies are scarce. That is the main reason we choose this topic for our 
final year projects. 
Our Approach 
Instead of adopting an approach of glimpsing a glut of spin-off cases to draw a general 
conclusion, our group prefers to choose a very classical case for detailed study. Consequently, our report 
will be full of profundity and analytical precision without doubt. The spin-off of Cheung Kong 
Infrastructure ]s-jidings Limited (CKI) is chosen to serve our need whereby two major questions will be 
'xamined in this project. 
1. W ‘ vere the managerial purposes or incentives for this spin-off? 
2. During (lie Initial Public Offering (IPO), whether the conditions and terms of financing like timing, 
offering size and pricing of CKI were appropriately pre-determined or not. 
As a matter of facts, these two simple questions could help us to evaluate whether this is a 





1. Before performing different kind of analyses, we will first describe the whole spin-off story of CKI. 
In particular, both the pre- or post-spin-off structure (financial as well as organisational structure) will 
be fully covered at the outset. 
2. What were the managerial purposes or incentive of the spin-off of CKI ？ In fact, we intend to sort out 
the supporting reasons to carry out this corporate deal. 
a) Firstly, we have reason bcl ‘ ;ve that Chcuiig Kong (Holdings) Limited (CKH) has a imminent 
rinancing need in FYK96. C ar surmise is based on the fact that CKH placed out 100 million new 
slkti.es，or 4.5.^ per cent of its exisiin< !osued share capital to institutional investors at HK$53.0 per 
share on Febi uary 6’ 1996. This was uic first share issue of CKH since the large scale rights issue 
announced on the eve of 1987 October stock market crash. Is our surmise right or wrong? Or 
whether CKH's financing needs had already been sufficiently served by the HK$5.3 billion gross 
proceeds from the aforementioned private share placement. We will find out the answers. 
b) Before the spin-olT of CKl, investors traditionally classified CKH as property developer with a 
very unclear theme of diversification. In fact, the contribution of property sales was merely 
accounted for 43 per cent of earning in FY1995 (the financial year before the spin-off of CKI) and 
the i.est were generated from sources like profit of Hutchison Whampoa Limited (HWL), building 
materials and property rental. The problem of information asymmetry occurred when institutional 
investors or financial analysts tried to assess the fundamental value of CKH because the financial 
disclosure of its non-property related business was insufficient. This intractable agency problem 
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has depressed the relative value of CKH for a long time, compared with those of other peers like 
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Sun Hung Kai Properties Limited (SHK Properties), New World Development Company Limited 
(New World) and Henderson Land Development Company Limited (Henderson Land). Market 
base indicators like Price to Eaming (P/E) ratio and Discount to Net Asset Value ^NAV) will be 
used to demonstrate this unfavourable trend to CKH. Meanwhile, our group will also use these 
indicators to examine whether this problem of information asymmetry was partially relieved after 
the spin-off of CKI. 
3. From the historical kaleidoscope of well-executed corporate activities, CKH has clearly demonstrated 
an inimitable savvy in packaging the erstwhile deals. Is same kind of appreciation deserved for the 
spin-off of CKI ？ We will examine this question by looking at the timing, offering size as well as the 
pricing of CKI. To be more precise, we will evaluate the ‘timing，of this spin-off by retrospectively 
looking at the market perception of PRC infrastructure stocks in the first half of 1996. In addition, the 
IPOs of other PRC infrastructure companies like New World Infrastructure Limited O^WI) and Road 
King Infrastr:.icture Limited (RKI) will also be considered inasmuch as their listing date were close to 
l''it of CKI. Aea)Ming to the basic law of derand, there is an inverse relationship between the 
c''i..mtity demanded and the price of any goods. The same rule should also be applicable to stocks of 
CK.1. \ are p)oing to look at whether the management of CK1 had successfully achieved a balance 
between thc offe',:ng size and the pricing of IPO. The IPO price will be compared with the other PRC 
:nfrastructure stocks, iii terms of prospective P/E, discount to Net Present Value (NPV) and discount to 
NAV on the eve of liie announcement date of CKI's spin-off. 
Up to this point, we must reiterate that we have no intention to critize the spin-off of CK1. In fact, 
this is an unfair game because the management of CKH and our group have separately made the own 
judgement based on two different information sets. CKH's information set probably consisted of some 
unknown private information whereas our set contains some post-spin-off information for certain. On the 
other hand, although both parties aiming at value-maximisation, the management of CKH probably made 
its decisions with other minor objectives like boosting up the short-term profitability or/and reducing the 
gearing ratio, etc. which may not be considered by us. Consequently, some of their decisions may be 
absurd on the surface. In fact, we would like to leam a lesson by reviewing and analysing the whole 
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process of spin-off of CKI. 
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CHAPTER III 
MAJOR BUSmESSES OF CHEUNG KONG (HOLDINGS) LIMITED PRIOR TO THE SPIN-OFF 
General Description 
CKH was incorporated in 1971 and listed in 1972. The founder, Chairman and the Managing 
Director of the company, Mr. Li Ka-shing has been active in the property business in Hong Kong since 
1958. Having property development as its main business, CKH is one of the leading developers in the 
mass residential property market. Apart from that, CKH also had interests in property investment, non-
property investments, infrastructure and cement & quarry operations. Its primary associate, Hutchison 
Whampoa Limited (HWL), is lho largest conglomerate in Hong Kong which held Hong Kong Electric 
Holdings Limited (HKE), tlr sol。provider of electncity to Hong Kong Island and Lamma Island. The 
Cheung Kong Group structure before tl 3pu. off of CKI is shown as follows: 
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The distribution ofCKH's Earnings Before Interest and Tax (EBIT) by line ofbusinesses for the past three 
fiscal years are summarised as follows: 
o/o FY1994 FY1995 FY1996 Average 
HK property development 50 « 4^ 46 
HK property investment 1 1 2 1 
Cement, concrete, aggregate & asphalt 2 5 3 3 
PRC projects 0 0 0 0 一 
Treasury & investment _ 12 14 一 1 0 12 
HWL — 33 ~ 37 — 38 “ 36 
Others 2 0 1 2 
FY1996 EBIT breakdown 
Cement, c o n c r e t e , � property 
. / ,. investment 
aggregatesanaasphall others 
Treasuiy 3% 1% 
& investment ^ ^ ^ A ^ K H H 
• ^ r r - ' ^ ' ' ^ " ' ' " ' ? ^ ^ ! ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
^ ^ * l M l l i i i | | g | ^ ^ ^ ] ^ P [ Q [ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ HK property development 
Z^T^N^^8 . 
^^^W^  
3 8 % 
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The distribution ofthe NAV o fCKH by major line ofbusinesses in 1996 is illustrated below: 
FY1996 NAV breakdown 
PRC projects Cement, concrete, 
6o/o aggregate&asphalt HKproperty 
Treasury& 〈 5/o development 
r^ 2fl* 
' " " ' ' ' V H | ^ ^ ^ | ^ ^ H | ^ ^ H ^ | ^ ^ V ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ HK property 




Major Lines ofBusiness 
1. Property development in Hong Kong 
Although the management was actively seeking to reduce the over-depeiidci^e on the 
property development business especially on the residential property side, the significance of property 
sales was on average accounted for nearly 50 per cent of CKH's operating profit. Hence, the 
Company was traditionally classified as a property developer in spite of its diversified operations. 
In the first half of 1996, CKH was the third largest developer in term of landbank size and it had the 
highest portion of residential sites among the major developers, which accounted for 80 per cent of its 
total developable landbank. CKH had a long history of concentrating mainly on large-scale 
developments of small to medium sized residential flats (i.e. less that 1,000 sq. ft). 
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~ % SHK Properties Henderson Land CKH New World 一 
Residential — 70 64 80 一 59 
"5M"ce 8 一 13 — 15 — 14 
"Retail 1 13 0 — 4 
"h^ustrial 21 10 5 23 
T)ther ~ ~ 0 0 “ 0 一 0 
lTotal GFA (m sq. ft) 26.5 13.3 12.1 6.1 
Sources: FY1996 Annual reports 
CKH was different from the other property developers in that it always had a high-proportion 
of joint-venture projects because of its lack of Letter B land exchange entitlements. Normally, its 
joint-venture partners were attracted by its experience in building large-scale projects and its proven 
record of being able to negotiate low land premiums with the government. Perhaps the most 
remarkable achievement was the speed at which CKH had been able to sell the badly-located 
Kingswood Villas during the last residential property doldrums (1994-95). It used several innovative 
marketing devices to promote sales, including the now-routine additional mortgage subsidies to help 
those first-time buyers, holding carnival parades, offering helicopter rides and hiring a team of real 
estate agents to contact potential buyers. All ofthese practices were still very unusual among the large 
property developers at that time. 
Looking into the FY1996 annual report, CKH had prepared the following property projects 
for sales. There were three main contributors: 2,860 units of Kingswood Villas; University Height, a 
joint venture development with HSBC Holdings and two best-located blocks of Laguna City which 
consisted of about 420 units. 
Properties for sale in FY1996 
Property Stake Usage Attributable GFA Unit salcs price estimates 
W (sq. ft) (HK$ m)' 
"Kingwood Villas 9 8 . ~ R — 1,919,218 一 2,650 
—Laguna City 50.0 R — 313,525 5,500 
University Heights 50.0 R 157,158 5,100 — 
"Concorclia Plaza 20.1 — 0 — 258,827 7,050 
~Nevv Treasure Centre 100.0 ~ I ~ 200,035 1,895 
Thing Yip Centre 100.0 I 24,000 2,100 
Total 2,872,764 — 
Residential = R, Office = 0，Industrial = I 
Sources: CKH annual report, Hong Kong Economic Times 
‘Based on the selling price of the secondary market 
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2. Property investment in Hong Kong 
CKH owns a relatively small investment property portfolio. Within the group, HWL is the 
major investor and holds the Group's major rental properties, while CKH had adopted a strategy of 
'developed and the sold’. CKH has disposed of the retail space that was developed as part of the 
company's major residential projects, such as Laguna City and South Horizons, though other 
developers tend to retain such space. Starting in 1996, there has been a change in CKH's strategy, 
perhaps prompted by objective to diversify the income sources. The retail podium at Bayshore Towers 
(located in Ma On Shan) had been leased instead ofbeing an outright disposal. 
3. China Properties 
Similar to other developers, CKH has accumulated a landbank in China of an attributable 8m 
sq. ft of developable floor space. The sites were evenly distributed in Beijing (29 per cent), 
Guangdong (27 per cent), Shanghai (19 per cent) and other areas (25 per cent), and were primarily for 
residential or commercial developments. None of the projects had pre-sold record up to FY1996. The 
major problem of lhe China property market was the supply glut in ali sectors, which was created by 
the earlier investment frenzy in an unregulated environment in 1992. The major cities had already 
seen rentals and prices ia!ling from their peak levels in 1995. Reacting to the poor state of the China 
property market, CKH had immediately slowed down its project construction even the Compan, had 
already invested about HK$4 billion in China properties up to FY1995. 
Potentially, CKH's most lucrative projects in China was the construction of Oriental Plaza, 
which located next to Beijing's Tiananmen Square. Nonetheless, the construction had been pending 
for approval until second half of 1997. ln a view to speeding up the process, a stake was already sold 
• 2 
to a government-related entity. 
In July 1994，CKH issued US$350m floating rate notes which could be exchanged into shares 
of Cheung Kong Holdings (China) Limited on its planned IPO before February 11，1998.^  
2 As background information, Oriental Plaza had been one of thc most controversial projects in recent Chinese history. The 
proposed development had encoiinlered three setbacks. There were complications regarding the closure of a McDonald's restaurant 
tli;u still had a 20 year lease to run at that time. The project was then turned down as the development exceeds the area's height 
limit. 
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4. Government subsidised housing (GSH) 
Not much mentioned by the investment community, CKH had five PRC govemment-
subsidised housing projects. In 1996，New World was the only other Hong Kong developer that had 
exposure to this type of development. After encountering so many problems in exploiting the PRC 
residential property market, investors gradually recognised that GSH was in fact, the best exposure to 
this market. Through margins were extremely low, the GSH programme had the guarantee of retums 
from provincial governments and the large project size ensured a stable source of future income. In 
addition, demand was from locals and did not rely on foreigners whose demand was comparatively 
difficult to estimate. Predicted by the management, these projects should able to make profit 
contribution after FY1999. 
Government-subsidised housing programme 
"Projects City Type GFA(sq. ft) 
"ChS7gyangVillage 一 Beijing R 一 4,897,620 “ 
Majiabao Western Beijing R 2,260,440 
-pj^ue Road " S h ^ o u R 11,302,200 
•Tiulong Lake Chongqing ~R 11,302,200 
Yaiighe Reservoir — Chongqing R 1,356,250 
5. Hutchison Whampoa Limited (HWL): the most valuable assets 
HWL was onc of the Hong koiv^'s leading conglomerates with interests in property 
development and investment, container terminals (HIT), retailing, telecommunications, energy and 
financial servicing, etc. In 1996, HWL had lifted its strategic stake in HIT to nearly 78 per cent. And 
it was becoming more active in port related infrastructure development in China. In addition, HWL 
also spun-ofi' the personal communication system (PCS) arm, Orange in United Kingdom in April 
1995, wherein HWL derived a windfall gain of approximately HK$4 billion. However, as HWL is not 
a major party in the whole spin-offof CKI, it will not be our core part of discussion. 
6. Cement, conci cte, aggregates and asphalt 
The cement and concrete businesses, through Green Island Cement (Holdings) Limited (GlC) 
and Anderson Asia (Holdings) Limited (AA), had enjoyed a 80 per cent growth in operating profit to 
HK$458m in FY1995. Due to CKH's monopolistic position in these businesses and lack of 
3 At thc time of writing, thc notes wcre matured without floatation of Cheung Kong Holdings (China) Limited. 
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penetration of imports, prices of its products — cement, concrete, aggregates and asphalt - have gone 
up significantly in line with increased demand. This, plus internal cost-cutting, has led to a 
tremendous increase in margins. 
Wolesa le price of c e m e n t 
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GIC was established in 1886, is the oldest cement producer in Asia and is the only cement 
manufacturei in the Hong Kong market. GlC had a 47 per cent share of the market in 1995, and 37 per 
cent of sales went to AA for concrete production. Fifty-five per cent of third-party sales went to 
Pioneer Concrete under a iong-term supply contract, which was expected to be renewed for another 
five years upon expiry in 1998. Average local consumption was about 4m tpa in 1995, 50 per cent of 
which was satisfied by imports from China and Japan. The risk of dumping by the major suppliers 
was unlikely to materialise, given regional demand for cement for infrastructure developments. 
Contrary to the common belief that the cement industry is cyclical, cement demand had averaged 3.8m 
tpa ovei lhc period from 1990 to 1995, staying within the range of3.3-4.2 m tpa. 
China was GlC's new target market. It only supplied foreign-funded projects in China, which 
were willing to pay higlicr prices for better quality and reliability. PRC sales accounted for 8 per cent 
in 1995. GlC planned to increase its presence in China by sub-contracting cement production to local 
companies under the ‘Golden Eagle’ brandname, thereby creating a branded product that could be sold 
at lower prices, especially as such sales were not subject to import duties 
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CKH acquired AA from HWL in 1989. AA derived income from three main sources: 
concrete (83 per cent); asphalt (15 per cent); and quarrying (2 per cent). Like GIC, AA had a leading 
position in the Hong Kong concrete market, with a 23 per cent market share in 1995. 
AA operated its own granite quarry at Lam Tei - there were only five quarries in Hong Kong-
and had two franchised aggregates suppliers in Shwnzhen and Zhuhai. Output from the top five 
companies, including AA, K Wah and Shui On, accounted for nearly 80 per cent of the ready-mixed 
concrete market. The need for a waterfront site for the import of raw materials has prevented 
competitors from entering the market. More importantly, concrete does not travel well, and operators 
need to have several batching sites. In 1995, AA operates at eight batching locations locally and also 
had stakes in two batching plants in Guangzhou and one in Zhuhai. AA was the only manufacturer in 
Hong Kong capable of producing 100 Mpa concrete. 
7. The PRC infrastructure development 
CM."s PRC infrastructure investments included tcll bridges/^ighway and power plants ii! 
G :ang,\)ng Province, p:.;ticularly in Shantou city, ln thc first half of 1996，CKH had sec ired toll 
roc; !/b, idge projects and six power plant projects. 
Shenzhen-Shar.+ou Highway, Eastern Section 
This is thc easlcrn section of the 268 ' ir. -"xpressway linking the two major coastal cities, 
Shenzhen and Shantou (the hom iown of Mr. Li K:i-shing). ln June 1993, a 75:25 joint venture 
between CKH and HWL entered inU an agreement to take a 30 per cent stake in the project, which 
involved a total investment ofHK$2 billion. 
Zhuhai Power Plant 
The first phase of the project, involving an investment of US$1.18 billion, consisted of two 
set of 700MW coal-fire generators. A Joint-venture majority owned by CKH and HWL held a 45 per 
cent stake in the project while the Guangdong Electricity Group and the Zhuhai Special Economic 
Zone Power Development Corporation owned the remaining 55 per cent. Under the master plan, the 
total capacity of the Zhuhai power plant would be 3,720 MW and total investment would reach US$3 
billion. Upon completion in 1999，the power plant will serve as the power-house of Zhuhai. Progress 
22 
of the project had been slowed down in 1994-1995, awaiting the arrangement of project financing. 
Shantou & Nanhai Power Plants 
In Nanhai, CKH had invested in two power plans. The 15 per cent owned Nanhai Power 
Plant Phase 1 consisted of a diesel/heavy oil generator with an installed capacity of 400 MW and was 
expected to commence operation in late 1996. The other plant, owned 18.2 per cent by CKH, was the 
Nanhai Jiangnan Power Station with installed capacity of 121 MW. The plant was operational. CKH 
also held a 22.5 per cent interest in three existing oil-fired power plants in Shantou with a total 
installed capacity of279 MW. 
CKH Power station projects 
~~Clty Name Group interest Installed Type of power Estimated year 
( ^ capacity (MW) plants of completion 
Shantou"""Shantou Tuopu Power 60 114 Diesel Existing 
Plant Oil/Heavy Oil 
Shantou Shantou Chenghai ^ ^ Diesel Existing 
Power Plant Qil/Heavy Oil 
Shantou Shantou Chaoyang ^ 90 Diesel Existing 
Power Plant O i _ a v y Oil 
Nanhai "Nanhai Power Plant I 30 一 400 Coaimeavy Oil 1996 
Nanhai Nanhai Jiangnam 36 n\ Oil Existing 
Power Station 
" ^ i h ^ Zhuhai Power Plant I [" 45 1,400 Coul |1999 ！ 
Sourcc: CKH annual report 
C K H Highway and bridge projects 
Name and location Group interest Approximate length Estimated year of 
^ (km) completion 
Shenzhen Shantou Highway, ^ i ^ ^ 
Eastern Section 
Shantou Bay Bridge 22.5 2.5 1996 
Source: CKH annual report 
8. Treasury investment 
CKH invested in listed shares in two forms: long-term and short-term investments. Through 
arguably the former was more ‘fixed’ in nature, while the latter was by definition for trading purposes, 
in reality CKH had been selling down its long-term portfolio. At the end of 1995, 48 per cent ofthe 
listed securities investment were held as current assets in terms of costs. Long-term investments in 
equities and convertible bonds began in 1991, when CKH invested substantial amount in listed 
property and related companies, and companies with China exposure. The core holdings in CKH's 
convertible portfolio were Shougang Concord International's and Guangzhou Investment's HK$587 
23 
million and HK$234 million issue, to expire in December 1998 and October 1998 respectively. Major 
Hong Kong-listed investments included a 12.4 per cent stake in Shougang Concord International, 5 per 
cent stake in Hopewell, 3.1 per cent stake in CEPA and 6.8 per cent stake in China Resources 




ANALYSIS OF FINANCIAL POSITION OF CKH 
On February 6, 1996, CKH had tumed to the market for cash, raising HK$5.3 billion in the 
second-largest placement in the SEHK's history^ It was placing 100 million shares with Li Ka-Shing 
Trustee Co Ltd at HK$53.00 per share for the purpose of providing additional general working capital to 
the Group. CKH was taking the opportunity to cash in as the market had gone up so much and CKH shares 
had gained almost 16 per cent so far this year. The placement price represented a discount of4.1 per cent 
on February 6，1996 closing price of HK$55.25. The shares was sold on a new-for~old basis, with the 
company selling 100 million existing shares - representing 4.5 per cent of capital - and creating an equal 
number of new ones. The placement followed a string of other cash calls by blue chips in a few months，. 
The proceeds were expected to be channelled into a string of property projects it was either involved in or 
bidding for. 
It is not surprising CKH is raising funds at that moment. ！ had an exceptionally expensive year in 
1995 when exploiting lower prices to accumulate new land. With mon_ major sites up for grabs in coming 
future, its bills look set to balloon further. Highlights include when CKH: 
• Announced in January 1995 the go-ahead for the redevelopi^^nt of the Hok Un power station in 
Hunghom in a joint venture with China Light & Power Co. The redevelopment would consist of 25 
residential towers, a five-storey commercial building and parking space. 
• Paid HK$565 million in August 1995 to buy Television Broadcasts' studio in Broadcast Drive, 
4 The placement is thc biggest since Citic Pacific raised inorc than HK$7 billion in January 1993. 
5 Henderson Land raised IlK$2.2 billion in December 1995 and Sun Hung Kai Properties and Citic Pacific raised HK$4.03 billion 
and HK$3.24 million, rcspcctivcly, in January 1996. 
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Kowloon Tong. It was estimated the site could be converted to 152,640 sq. ft of living space. 
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• Bought a 164,689 sq. ft residential site in Tai Po at a government land auction in September 1995 for 
HK$280 million. 
• Formed a consortium with Citic Pacific to win the HK$8 billion tender for rights to build 2.64 million 
sq. ft ofhousing above the Mass Transit Railway Corp's (MTRC) new airport railway station on Tsing 
Yi Island. 
• Teamed with HWL in December 1995 to win rights to build a 1.4 million sq. ft commercial complex 
on the Hunghom Bay reclamation with the Kowloon-Canton Railway Corp. The HK$6 billion 
development would include a 600-room hotel and three office towers. 
• Formed a consortium in December 1995 to bid for rights to develop an HK$8 billion residential site 
above the MTRC's planned station on the West Kowloon reclamation, large enough to provide 1.59 
million sq. ft ofhousing space. 
• Led a consortium in January 1996 to bid for rights to carry out the proposed HK$40 billion 
commercial development above the MTRC's planned station on the Central reciamation. 
• Revised plans given the go-ahead by Beijing's planning commission to complete its controversial 
US$1.2 billion Oriental Plaza coinmcrcial development in Beijing near Tiananmen Square and the 
Forbidden City. 
• Joined HWL to win a tender on 5th February 1996 with a HK$2.7 billion bid to secure a 277,980 sq. ft 
residential site at Ma On Shan. 
• Appeared likely to bid for a HK$2 billion 172,224 sq. ft commercial-residential site at Hung Hom Bay 
reclamation next month. 
Other Financial Obligations 
Apart from bank borrowings, CKH also had the following significant financial obligations: 
In 1993，Cheung Kong Finance Cayman Limited (CKFCL), a wholly owned subsidiary, issued 
US$500 million guaranteed bonds in bearer form which carry interest at the fixed rate of 5.5% per annum. 
Since the date of issue, US$242,450,000 of the said bonds had been redeemed and US$257,550,000 
remained outstanding at 31st December 1996. These bonds, which are guaranteed by the Company and 
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listed on the Luxembourg Stock Exchange, will mature in September 1998. 
In 1994, CKFCL issued another US$500 million guaranteed step-up floating rate notes in bearer 
form which carry interest at the rate of 0.6% above the 3 months LIBOR. These notes, which are 
guaranteed by the Company and listed on the Luxembourg Stock Exchange, will mature in January 2001 
or, at the options of the noteholders giving not less than 60 days' notice, become redeemable in January of 
each year from 1997 to 2000. 
In 1994，Cheung Kong Finance China Limited (CKFCL), a wholly owned subsidiary, issued 
US$350 million exchangeable guaranteed floating rate notes in bearer form which carry interest at the rate 
of 0.5% above the 3 months LIBOR. The notes are exchangeable into shares of Cheung Kong Holdings 
(China) Limited (CKHCL), another wholly owned subsidiary, only after an initial public offering by 
CKHCL of its shares on a stock exchange. Since the date of issue, US$39,500,000 of the said notes has 
been purchased back by another wholly owned subsidiary. These notes, which are guaranteed by the 
Company and listed on the Luxembourg Stock Exchange, will mature in August 1999; or at the options of 
the noteholders giving not less timn 60 days' notice, tK、〔、oim redeemable in August 1997 or; at the options 
of the noteholders giving not ler;s than 30 days' notice, become redeemable on the first anniversary date of 
the listing ofCK! :CL. 
With thc poiu)tial early redemption, al the option of the noteholders, of the U$500 million 
guaranteed step-up floating rates notes issued by CKFCL and the US$310.5 million outstanding 
exchangeable guaranteed floating rat^ s^ notes issued by CKFCL, the total cash commitment in 1997 
amounted to approximately HK$6.3 billion. With the remaining US$258 million guaranteed bonds issued 
by CKFCL matured in September 1998，an extra HK$2 billion is required. Together with the huge capital 
requirements for the property development project in HK and the PRC infrastructure business, CKH should 
have a significant cash burden. 
The following is an extract of the CKH capital commitment from the 1996 annual report, which 
can illustrate the huge capital requirement of the PRC infrastructure projects. 
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Capital Commitments as at 31st December 
(HK$ millions) m 6 1995 
Contracted for 
Fixed assets 102 48 
PRC projects 2,336 449 
Others 59 -
2,497 497 
Authorised but not contracted for 
Fixed assets 248 124 
Others 31 80 
279 204 




Alternative financing methods available to solve the tight cash flow requirements of CKH which 
included: 
• Syndicated loan facility. Given the financial creditability of Cheung Kong Group, it would not have 
any problem. However, interest cost would be higher than before owing to the rise in gearing ratio. 
• Convertible bond. Although the interest rate was relatively cheaper, the potential premium payable 
on non-conversion and the dilution effect upon conversion made the instrument unattractive. There 
would be also some financial covenants to maintain such as debt to equity ratio and debt service 
coverage. 
• Refinancing of existing bank loan. Sufficient cash and credit would not be immediately available to 
covci- (. istiiig capital commitmciiLs as well as projects under negotiation for the next few years. 
• Long-term commercial paper. It was not a commonly used financing method in Hong Kong. 
• Floating rates notes. CKH would need to bear interest rate risk. 
• New equity issue/rights issue: It had the disadvantage of diluting the interest of Li's family interest in 
CKH and put pressure on current share price. 
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• Spin-off^ of infrastructure-related businesses. 
Environment in both the IPO market and the stock market in general are critical. The favorable 
equity markets had provided significant funds for many infrastructure companies in the first half of 1996. 
CKH was the latest in a series of Hong Kong companies to spin-off infrastructure and related businesses. 
These actions could unlock the eamings potential of their businesses. CKH's spun-off unit also benefited 
from its parent's size and reputation, as well as its own diversified sources of eamings. 
Based on the 1996 consolidated cash flow statement of CKH, we can see that CKH cash balance 
would be negative in the absence of the two major corporate activities (ie private placement and spin-off of 
CKI) in 1996. If CKH borrowed debt, instead of issuing new shares and the spin-off of CKI, its gearing 
ratio would be increased sharply which made the future borrowing and refinancing activities more 
expensive. 
6 Please refer to Appendix I for an analysis of spin-off. 
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CHAPTER VI 
THE WHOLE STORY OF CKI'S SPIN-OFF 
On May 20, 1996, CKH formally announced it had already applied to the Stock Exchange of 
Hong Kong (SEHK) to spin-off its PRC infrastructure business. Although CKH confirmed the widespread 
market talk about its spin-off, it did not elaborate the deal in great details. Besides, CKH also revealed that 
it had signed a letter of intent with the Nanhai City Government for the development of roads and power 
plants. The market naturally thought that these projects would be a part of the spin-off unit. At that time, 
some investors started to speculate that CKH would like to restructure the overlapping infrastructure 
business of the whole CKG by injecting both CKH's and HWL's infrastructure projects into the spin-off 
unit. Their rationale was that by inclusion of the port business of HWL would substantially increase the 
size as well as earning quality of the new company which would therefore become more attractive to 
forei{ ii investors. Responding to this news of spin-off which might rcap strong gain for bo.：. CKH and 
HWL, CKH and HWL shares finished 1.9 per ccnt and 1.7 per cent highc. at HK$54.25 and HK$48.50 
respectively. 
On May 24, 1996, the South China Moming Post reported that HWL's managing director Mr. 
Canning Fok clarified that HWL's PRC port operations would not be included in the proposed listing 
company but HWL would sell its power and road projects to CKH to serve this purpose. 
On May 28，1996, Hong Kong Economic Journal reported that CKH made it clear that convertible 
bondholders of Cheung Kong Holdings (China) Limited were nol allowed to convert their bonds into the 
new shares of its spim-offunit. 
On June 5，1996, Hong Kong Economic Journal reported that CKH had signed the letter of intent 
and paid RMB1.5 billion for eleven toll bridges in southern Guangdong province of China. The market 
believe that these roads would be injected into the new spun-off unit. 
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On June 10，1996, CKH said the assets of its infrastructure unit was worth about HK$11.98 
billion and it would be named as Cheung Kong Infrastructure Holdings Limited (CKI). After the 
listing, CKI would still backed by CKH's management team and Mr. Victor Li Tzar-kuoi (the elder son 
of Mr. Li Ka-shing) as chairman while Mr Kam Hing-Iam as managing director. CKH made it clear that 
CKI would include the following projects: 
Roads Power Plants Building materials 
Shantou Bay Bridge Nanhai Plants Green Island Cement 
Shenshan Highway Shantou Plants Anderson Asia 
Nanhai Roads Zhuhai Plant 
Source: IPO prospectus of CKI 
CKI was expected to earn at least HK$728 million in the FY1996, 27.9 per cent more than that of 
last financial year. 
At a luncheon presentation on June 11，1996, CKH announced details of the spin-off of CKI. 
CKI would sell 297.8 million new share, which represented 22.5 per cent of the company's enlarged issued 
share capital of HK$1.3 billion. 268.0 million or 90 per cent of new shares were offered to institutional 
investors in a global placei;ienl. The offering price range )ul(: be HK$11.00 to HK$12.65 each, which 
was equivalent to 20.3 to 23.4 times of CKI's forecast earnings !:er share in FY1996, and 5 per cent to 15 
per cent below ils 'iet asset value per share. HSBC Investment Bank Asia and CEF Capital were appointed 
as joint co-ordinators foi iiie global placement. Bo'.‘i p;a ties had an over-allotment option (greenshoe) to 
offer an additional 44.2 million CK1 sl.ares after the listing. If this option was exercised, the total number 
of shares offered to the public would be 342 million which accounted for 25 per cent of CKI's total shares. 
On Juiy 1，1996, CKH announced tliat the global placement of CKI secured a satisfactory result 
by capturing a 10 times ovcrsnbscriptions. After considering the strong response, CKH and the joint co-
ordinators fixed the offering price at HK$12.65, which was at the top end of the offering price range. CK1 
would raise IiK$3.8 billion through the sale. That amount would increase to HK$4.3 billion if the over-
allotment option was exercised. Furthermore, CKH also announced that the IPO of CKI would begin on 
July 7,1996 and close on July J1,1996. 
On July 12，1996, CKH said the IPO of CKI was 23.2 times oversubscribed. Because of the 
strong retail demand, CK1 determined to 'clawback' 14.9 million shares that it sold earlier to institutions 
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and sell them to the retail investors. 
On July 17，1996, CKI shares failed to sparkle on their debut amid the bad sentiment of the 
overall market. CKI shares reached a high of HK$12.90 on its first trading day but fell back to close at 
HK$12.75, a petty rise of 10 cents or 0.79 per cent from the HK$12.65 issue price. Meanwhile, the Hong 
Kong market had suffered mainly on Wall Street's losses amid concem on interest rate hike. Hang Seng 
Index posted a 18.88 points loss and closed at 10,609.10 after dropping 172.15 points on one day before. 
Investors were generally disappointed by the share price performance because the CKI shares in the grey 
market had once pitched at about HK$14.00 one week prior to its debut, quoted by South China Moming 
Post. 
For details regarding the business profile, management team, major line of businesses etc of CKI, 
please refer to Appendix II. Please also refer to Appendix III for a more detailed Cheung Kong Group 
Structure Chart after the spin-off. 
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CHAPTER VII 
MARKET COMMENTS ON CKI'S SPn^-OFF 
In this section, our group summarises and analyses the market comments on the spin-offofCKI. 
1. The deal was welcomed by the market 
Abnormal Share Price Performance of CKH After the 
Announement of CKI's Spin-off 
% 
T 2 
Announcement Day <^--^• """""^ ^ ^ ^ 
M|Abnormal Return _-^ "<"--"""""^ S^C""""""""^  / "^'^ 
_fiB_Cumulative Abnormal Return ^^^^^^^^^^ _^________<>>^ "^^"""^""""^y^ ^^ \^i f 
i|frg^Tr^ $f^ .^..^ j>^4T^ I^ ^^ . ^  0 
pfF^ tfn^  
- 2 
The market did hold the view that the CKH was the ultimate beneficiary of the CKI's spin-off 
by increasing the shareholders' wealth. To prove this point, our group plots the daily abnormal retums 
and the summation of daily abnormal retums (cumulative abnormal retums) of CKH starting from ten 
days prior to CKI's spin-off announcement day until ten days post that important announcement. The equation applied i  RcKH _ betacKH * Rnsi, where 
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RcKH = the daily retum o f C K H 
betacKH 二 the beta ofCKH under the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM)^ 
R_Hsi = the daily retum of Hang Seng Index 
Evidently, the spin-offof CKI was definitely a value-added deal for CKH. The stock price of 
CKH had set to accumulate a positive abnormal retum ten days before the formal announcement of 
CKI's spin-off and this rising trend of cumulative abnormal retum could also sustain for next ten days 
after the formal announcement. This implies that investors showed great enthusiasm to this spin-off 
and had been increasing their stakes in CKH in the meantime. 
2. CKI was not a China play 
Even though the successful listing of CKI was fully appreciated by the market, fund managers 
were having split opinions on this issue. First and foremost, the two Hong Kong based construction-
material-makers, GIC and AA would have accounted for HK$2.3 billion, or 93.2 per cent, of CKI's 
total revenues and HK$438.2 million, or 80.5 per cent of ib tot:il earnings in 1995. On a net asset 
valuc base, lhese tvv ： makers also ii ‘ ..sented nearly 48 per cent o； net asset value. By all means, 
investors were buj ing a Hong Kong inlrasiructure company with some PRC exposures indeed. 
NAV breakdown of CKI 
PR . toll roads & 
brids^as 
15per cent 
PRC power stations t » „ « _ _ _ _ _ _ ^ _ 
7 一 | f ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ M ^ M p ^ ^ 5 -
^ B f ^ j ^ ^ ^ j ^ B ^ 
New proceeds + 
capitalised Net assets = HK$16.3 billion 
shareholders funds 
30 per cent 
7 The value ofbeta is 1.13.which was calculated by using Bloomberg terminal and the time horizon was January 1 1996 to June 1 
1996. 
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Then why did CKH select this unbalanced portfolio for CKI. Our group surmises that CKH 
did not accumulate enough high quality assets to capture the sudden demand in this PRC infrastructure 
spin-off fever8. It was understandable because in one personal interview with Bloomberg News, Mr Li 
Ka-shing disclosed that CKH's PRC investment was not more than HK$10 million before 1992 and 
his personal influence was only limited in Shantou area where he bome. Besides, as we mentioned 
before, interests of the toll roads and power plants of CKI were just purchased in hurry from HWL for 
spin-off purpose. Furthermore, the Nanhai power plant and road network were purchased just 
approximately one month prior to the spin-off announcement of CKI. These projects were still in the 
infancy stage, the financing need was imminent whereas the profit contributions were far remote. As a 
result, GIC and AA must be injected into CKI to provide the company's recurrent income base for 
future expansions. 
3. The whole deal was in hurry 
Not only the injected assets were prepared in great hurry, but also CKH was suspected to 
spend only two Hionths or even shorter for the deal diligence. What is our reasoning? On April 26, 
1996, the Hong Kong Economic Times reported that CKI had planned to inject four Hebei toll roads 
into a listcci company called CEF Concord Holding Ltd (CEFC) (the name of the company change to 
ITC Corporation Ltd. in February 27, 1997)，which was a shell company and 36.1 per cent held by a 
consortium led by CKH. These four toll roads had already in operation and they were claimed to have 
a promising profit potential (These roads were later sold to CKI after its listing). Even the market 
rumour was denied by CKH, giving the details of the news descriptions, it could quite clear that CKH 
once prepare to list out its PRC infrastructure unit by means of a shell company. Our group believes 
that CKH had made a sea change in the original strategy for several reasons. Firstly, the listing of 
NWI showed that the market extremely favour and was willing to pay a higher price premium for an 
infrastructure company having a huge and diversified portfolio (comprising of PRC roads, power 
plants and some Hong Kong based recurrent income sources), hence the spin-off of CK1 was a well-
8 In view ofthe recent fever of spin-off in Hong Kong, the SEHK has introduced a guidance note on 12th May 1997 and is 
summarised in Appendix IV. 
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matched strategy. Secondly, assets injection into a small company like CEFC required a very long 
process, it would take one or even two years to inject new PRC infrastructure projects in retum for 
share placements to both CKH and institutional investors. (Like the case between Citic Pacific 
Limited and CITIC). By adopting a one-off listing of CKI, CKH was able to capture a sentiment 
climax by asking for a higher offering price. 
4. The valuation of CKI was rich 
The bearish market sentiment was blamed to be the culprit of CKI's disappointing 
performance on the first five trading days. Apart from that, we think CKI's IPO price (HK$12.65) was 
fundamentally demanding to induce public interests. Trading at about 23.4 times FY1996 prospective 
P/E meant that it was at par to NWI's FY1996 prospective P/E of 24.2 times^ and also at a large 
premium to RKI's FY1996 prospective P/E of 19.0 times'®. CKI was not cheap in any sense, so it did 
not provide a trading opportunity for short term investors. As a result, its share price was not exciting 
011 its !ebut. 
9 Based oii closing price on July 17, 1996 
'"Based on closing price on July 17, 1996 
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CHAPTER VIII 
THE MAIN REASON FOR CKI's SPm-OFF 
As the major shareholder who held 33.4 per cent of CKH, Mr Li. Ka-shing had an excellent track 
record of creating value for shareholders in making every strategic decisions concerning CKH. A brief 
history ofmajor strategic decisions made by CKH is summarised in Appendix V. Our group believes the 
spin-offofCKI was not an exception. 
1. The past track record 
The substantial re-rating o「::KH in 1995 was mainly triggered by HWL's spin-off ofOrange, 
a UK mobile phono operator. The deal made CKH to be the highest-gaining property developer for 
the year, with a 57 per cent increase in share price, outperforming SHK Properties (47 per cent) and 
Henderson Land (31 per cem), '^o narrowing the gap between CKH and the two companies. 
However, havin- started from a rathc. ',ow t 丨记，CKH was still trading at discounts to others in its peer 
group in first halfd. 19%. Our question is wlv,.uci- this discrepancy is justified or not. Supposed we 
simply followed the traditional wisdom by classifying CKH as a property developer and comparing its 
share price in term ofP/Es with other peers. As can be seen from the table below, CKH was the least 
expensive, in terms ofP/Es in that time. 
;VE(x) — 
“1995A 1996A 1997E 1998E 
" a ^ — 13.1 “ 12.6 Tl .4 "9.7 
Henderson Land ~ 15 13.2 11.8 [0,4 
SHK Properties ‘ 20.3 ~ W 16.7 14.7 
New World 22 19 16.6 | l3 .6 
Source: Bloomberg 
As Henderson Land is generally perceived as a pure developer, we have used its P/Es to 
represent the market ratings for property development profit. We have stripped out HWL and 




50 per cent discount to Henderson Land in term of P/E. As CKH's landbank was more concentrated 
on the high value-added residential sites, its quality was not inferior to that of its peer group. Was this 
deep discount unjustified? 
P 7 ^ NAV 
premium/(discount)% 
1995A 1996A 1997E 1998E — 
T K l T " 一 7.3 T l " ^ 9 5.7 顶 一 
Henderson Land 15 13.2 U.8 • 10.4 ^ 
Discount to Henderson T i ^ 42 45 20 
Land (%) 
Source: Bloomberg 
As we have extensively explained above, CKH had many facets indeed. It is categorised as a 
property developer, but its diversified operations offered the flavour of a conglomerate. Some had 
even valued CKH as a holding company. In addition, how about those 'hidden assets' in the balance 
sheet. Similar to CKH, New World had been trading at a deep discount to other developers for some 
'unknown reasons'. However, its ratings have substantially readjusted after the spin-off o fNWI and 
the revaluation ofth^ China property portfolio for the convertible bond issue. 
Another reason that CKH had been trading at a discount is because it is being treated as a 
holding company on the basis that HWL contributes 50 per cent to CKH's NAV and nearly 40 per cent 
to earnings. Holding companies normally trade at discounts to other companies. For advocates ofthis 
view, the spin-off of CKI and likely listing ofthe China properties division iii 1998 further entrench 
their beliefs. However, we do not believe that CKH has the characteristics of a typical holding 
company unless it spins off its Hong Kong property development operation, which seems a non-value-
added scenario in the view of investors. 
Even if we take their view as truth, we still can not justify the low valuation of CKH. By 
taking another blue chip companies, Wheelock & Company (WC) as an example: WC has derived 
some 80 per cent of its eamings from its listed subsidiaries and associates, including Wharf, New Asia 
Realty, Realty Development Corporation, Lane Crawford etc.., which also accounted for over 90 per 
cent of its NAV. Showed in the table, CKH even had a greater discount and lower P/E than WC. 
WHY? 
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n P/E (x) NAV 
premium/(discount)% 
“1995A 1996A 1997E 1998E “ 
CKH — 13.1 12.6 " l l . 4 "T? .(11.9) 
~ ^ ~ 16.3 15.2 13.4 15.4 (8.3) — 
Source: Bloomberg 
Then how about regarding CKH as a conglomerate. Although the Company has the 
diversified nature of a conglomerate, it was very dependence on the profit generating from property 
sales. Consequently, investors also asked for a discount when investing in CKH. This point can be 
demonstrated when comparing the valuation of CKH with that of other 'hongs' including HWL, it is 
bound that CKH was cheaper than a typical 'hong，. 
P ? E l ^ NAV 
premium/(discount)% 
1995A 1996A 1997E 1998E — 
CKH 一 13.1 ‘ 12.6 11.4 ~ 7 (11.9) 
HWL — 22.5 • 18 17 ~5.5 (1) 
Citic Pacific ~ 2 ^ 11.7 19.7 一 16.6 31 
Swire Pacific 16.9 15 13.9 12.5 (3) 
^ t Pacific 10.5 15.2 12.9 11.5 (22) — 
Source: Bloomberg 
2. Information asymmetry 
Supposed CKH was cheapest according to any general classification methods, uid it imply the 
market efficiency ofthe Hong Kong stock market was very low in 1996? We do not share this view 
for two reasons: 
We do consider that there existed an information asymmetry problem between the 
shareholders and management of the whole Cheung Kong Group at that time. Firstly, there were too 
many overlapping in the business operations of the whole group befo.o spin-off of CKI. For instance, 
both CKH and HWL had significant direct exposure in the PRC infrastructures projects. The 
overlapping was most serious in CKH because it nearly had some interests in any main businesses of 
the Group. This unclear business theme make the work of foi ccasting profit growth of CKH extremely 
difficult. Secondly, CKH held ii very grcat portfolio of the PR" infrastructure projects like those 
bridges, expressways and power plants. As their short-temi contributions were not significant, equity 
analysts sometimes even ignored them in calculation the future profits and NAV of CKH. In the other 
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word, they were *hidden assets, in the balance sheet of CKH. May be even analysts would like to 
make a more comprehensive analysis on these PRC projects, they did not have sufficient information 
to do so. Without a clear disclosure on the terms and conditions of each project in particular, 
estimation on cashflows was very difficult if not impossible. For this reason, our group think that the 
spin-off of CKI was a value-added strategy for shareholders of CKH. In fact, CKH started to 
consistently outperformed the Hang Seng property index after the CKI's spin-off. 
“ CHEUNG KONG HDG. 
85 FROM 31/ 5/96 TO 30/ 5/97 DAILY 
80 : I 
1 i^  / 
H , n ^ r ^ 
eo H 广 
55 S C / ^ y V < ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ A v j 
50 MAY ‘ JUN ‘ J U L � A U G ‘ SEP ‘ OCT ‘ NOV ‘ DEcT—JAN ‘ FEB ‘ MAR ‘ APR ^ MAY^ 
PRICE HIGH 80.00 26/5/97, LOW 52.25 17/7/96, LAST 79.25 
二 PRICE REL TO HANG SENG PROPERTIES Source: DATASTREAM 
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CHAPTER IX 
OTHER MANAGERIAL PURPOSES AND mCENTIVES OF CKI'S SPIN-OFF 
1. Generate extraordinary profit 
The spin-offs went forward under the rubrics of restructuring and creation of shareholder 
value. In fact, the spin-off exercise generated an exceptional gain of HK$1.5 billion for CKH. Such 
gain arising from dilution of the CKH's interest through placing and new issue of shares in CKI 
pursuant to the spin-off of the CKH's interest in infrastructure and related business. 
2. Capital raising 
Generally speaking, the spun-off unit can raise more equity capital by going public as an 
alternative or complement to funding obtained from banks and . 'iei financial institutions. No interest 
is payable on equity raised, although sharc!ioIders will expect to receive dividends. It also reduces the 
huge capital commitment from parent. The net proceeds from the CKI share offer, after deducting 
related expenses, were estimated to amount HK$4,158 mi!'jon since the over-allotment option is 
exercised in full. The Directors of CKI h?d proposed to utilise the net proceeds in the following ways: 
• approximately HK$l,125 million would be ^sed to meet the capital contribution requirements of 
the Group relating to the road and power businesses; '!nd 
• the remaining balance would be u)ed for potential investments in the future and for general 
corporate purposes. 
Besides, as a listed company, the spu .-off unit can more easily obtain loans from financial 
institutions and at a more favorable interest rate because it is more "transparent". In other words, 
financial institutions have a better knowledge of the company by reference to its published accounls, 
announcements of new projects, etc., as reflected in the market price of its shares. On August 8, 1997, 
CKI assembled a group of banks to underwrite a HK$3.8 billion five years loan package to refinance 
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debt and enhance working capital. The interest rates for CKI was 39 basis points more than the 
HIBOR rates and CKI was granted the option to choose whether the one-, two-, three-. Or six-, month 
HIBOR was used as the pricing benchmark. The term of financing was even more favorable than 
those offered to CKH indeed. 
3. Business expansion 
The spun-off unit can also pay for the acquisition of other businesses by issuing its own 
shares to shareholders ofthe target company, instead of paying cash or arranging for loan finance. For 
example, CKI had acquired the 35 per cent interest of HKE from HWL by issuing new shares in 
January 1997. 
4. The company's value is easily determined 
Once the initial value ofthe spun-off ; nit's shares is determined at the time of listing, the 
value will change on a daily basis according to its financial results, its future plans rnd prospects, the 
trading volume and other inai ket factors. The availability of an indicative share price on a daiiy basis 
facilitates the trading and transferring of shares and can increase the shareholders base. 
5. Status 
The spun-offunit 's status in the eyes of third parties is greatly enhanced by obtaining a public 
listing. This can assist it in negotiations with suppliers, customers and bankers, and tlu.s lead to an 
improvement in its business operations generally. Furthermore, the morc oft( the name ofthe spun-
off unit appears in newspaper articles, the better it should be known by tne investing public and its 
target customers. 
6. Portfolio insurance 
By spin-off CKI, CKH could also minimise the downside risks associated with a Chinese 
infrastructure developer, such as capital intensive requirement, delays in completion and the 




7. Indication of financial strength 
As a company must meet some strict requirements before it is listed, its listing indicates that it 
has successfully fulfilled such criteria. Its reputation will be further enhanced if it can continually 
produce good financial results, which should lead to an increase in its share price. A run up in the 
price of the spun-off unit should positively impact the value of the parent, which remains majority 
control. This will also put it in a good position to raise further capital by means of rights issues or 
private placements. 
8. Promotion of share options schemes 
Part of staff remuneration can be provided by way of a share option scheme, which can also 
act as an incentive to increase profits and productivity. However, such a scheme is only viable if staff 
can easily assess the value ofthe company's shares and, eventually, sell their holdings for cash at any 
time. Going public can therefore enable the spun-offunit lo employ, motivate and retain high calibre 
executive talents. 
9. Improved financial position 
The debt ofthe spin-off is removed from the parent company's balance sheet. This resulted 
in lower parent company debt and, possibly, reduced financial leverage. 
Spun-off unit often pays special dividends to their parent as part of the spin-off transaction. 
Spun-offwill also benefit from the reduced interest expense on debt forgiven by the parent because of 
loan capitalisation. For example, CKH had forgiven debt to CKI and such transactions alter the 
financial structure ofthe spun-offunit and its profitability going forward. 
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CHAPTER X 
POSSIBLE DISADVANTAGES OF SPW-OFF 
1. Public scrutiny 
The spun-off will become the focus of investors' and the media's attention after listing. Its 
activities will be monitored by the public and exposed to critical comment both in the press and 
elsewhere. 
2. New responsibilities and pressures 
The spun-off unit must observe all the Listing Rules and other requirements of the SEHK, 
such as the publication of its interim and annual reports, and 丨 uii:g notices to shareholders and the 
public regarding significant acquisitions and disposals of assets, and deals with connected parties 
transactions. In addition, the public would expect the spin-off to distribute dividends periodically. 
3. Time and expense 
A considerable amount of executive time can be taken iip in communicating with the SliHK 
and shareholders both during and after the spin-off process. However, investors can obtain a better 
understanding ofthe spun-offs business by examining its published financial and other information, 
which should in tum attract further investment. Additional administrative expenses will be borne by 
the spun-offunit as a public company. 
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4. Directors' remuneration and liabilities 
The determination of directors' remuneration and retirement fund provisions is governed by 
stricter rules and monitored more carefully than with private companies. In addition, directors have to 
undertake to observe the SEHK's Model Code for Securities Transactions by Directors of Listed 
Companies, which sets out certain restrictions on dealing in shares of the company, for example when 
the directors have access to confidential information that will affect the price of the shares. Directors 
also have to comply fully with the provisions of the Securities (Disclosure of Interests) Ordinance and 
the Securities (Insider Dealing) Ordinance. 
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CHAPTER XI 
THE SHARE PRICE PERFORMANCE OF CKI 
CKI was listed at the selling price of HK$12.65 each, which was equivalent to 23.4 times its 
FY1996 forecast earnings per share and 5 per cent below its NAV per share. The Company issued 342.30 
million shares and raised HK$4.3 billion in total. In term of the involved amount, this was the largest IPO 
in 1996 indeed. Although the IPO of CKI was 23.2 times oversubscribed, our group believed that the 
issuing price of CKI was set at a relatively expensive level. Therefore, its share price was not performed 
very well shortly after its debut, We think CKI's IPO price (HK$12.65) was fundamentally demanding to 
induce public interests. Trading at about 23.4 times FY1996 prospective P/E meant that it was al p?'' to 
NWI's FY1996 prospective P/E of 24.2 times" and also at a large pre :ium io Road King's FY1996 
prospective P/E of 19.0 times'l CKI was not cheaj； in any sense, so it did not provide a trading 
opportunity for short term investors. As a result, its share price was iOt exciting on its debut. 
Fortunately, its strong eaming momentum became the key deternjinai. to support CKl's stock 
performance in the long term. Why does our group draw this view? Our ^roi p will first evaluated the 
share price performance of CK1 in both short-term and long-ternr Subsequently, vvc will argue why the 
IPO price seemed to be too high at that moment. 
”Based on closing price on July 17, 1996 
12 Based on (,losing price on July 17, 1996 
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1. The short-term performance of CKI 
In order to shed some light on CKI's short-term performance after its debut, we have 
evaluated the share price performance of 47 China-related IPOs which were newly listed during 
January 1992 to December 1996. The raw data are summarised in Appendix VI. The following chart 
shows that nearly 70 per cent of these stocks reached their first significant share price peak 30 days or 
less after their IPO whereas CKI totally used 45 days to reach its first peak. Beside, CKI also needed 
355 days to reach its historical high (calculation up to June 1997) whereas 56 per cent of these 47 new 
issues came to their respective historical high in less than 180 days. Although CKI had a relatively 
stable price appreciation in the meantime, short-term traders generally prefer stocks which can reach 
its historical high as early as possible, so that they can take profit and then switch to another issue. 
Time-lag between IPO, historic high and first peak 
( % ) 國 First peak H Historical high ( 1 9 9 2 to 1 9 9 6 ) 






First day 2 -10 d a y s 1 0 - 3 0 d a y s 3 0 - 9 0 days 9 0 - 1 8 0 1 8 0 - 3 6 5 1-2 years More than 
d a y s d a y s 2 y e a r s 
Next, nearly 67 per cent of these 47 selected shares traded higher than the IPO price in the 
first five trading days. However, CKI declined by 3.5 per cent within the same period. To sum up our 
observations, it is obvious that CKI had been underperforming shortly after its debut. 
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Average share price performance in first five trading days 
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2. Long-term performance of CKI 





Down Down Down Up 0- Up Up Up 
50- 20- 0 -20% 20% 20- 50- over 
100% 50% 50% 100% 100% 
While the short-term performance of CKI was not very good when compared with its peer 
group, its long-term performance was excellent. CKI accumulated appreciated by 107.1 per cent in 
one year's time, which is better than these 47 China-related IPO which only surged 18.3 per cent on 
average and with just 19 per cent of them could achieve a 100 per cent or above price gain. 
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" STOCK PRICE PERFORMANCE OF CKI, NWI & RK 
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ROAD KING INFRASTRUCTURE Source: DATASTREAM 
In a n o t h e r test, the relative pci formance of CKI is compared with that of RKI and NWI. CKI 
was clearly outperformed another two PRC infrastructure stocks. 
3. Reasons for the short-term underperforming of CKI 
Among several factors, our group observes that the oversubscription rate is a variable that has 
a very close relationship with the share price performance immediately after the IPO. When our group 
plots ' the percent of share price accumulated appreciation in the first five trading days' as a dependent 
variable against 'the oversubscription rate' as the independent variable. The resulting regression line 
is: 
Percentage of share price accumulated appreciation in the first five trading days 
=-4 percent +0.2 per cent x oversubscription rate 
The R2 is 0.71，which is quite satisfactory. This is also consistent with the rationale that the 
rate of oversubscription demonstrates the demand for the scrip in the primary market. It this ratio is 
high, it means many investors are unable to obtain ^.ares in the primary market, in which the only 
choice is to buy them in the secondary market. 
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As the oversubscription rate o fCKH is 23.1 times, it should have a 0.62 per cent share price 
accumulated appreciation in the first five trading days according to the above equation, then why did 
the stock price declined by 3.5 per cent indeed. Our group believes another unfavourable factor is the 
general decline of the overall market during that period. Because of the rekindled worry on the US 
inflation rate, the Hang Seng Index had totally dropped by 2.3 per cent during these five trading days. 




Looking backwards through time, the market capitalisation of CKI has grown from HK$17.9 billion in 
the debut on July 12，1996 to its historical high ofHK$63.5 billion on August 6, 1997. Furthermore, 
based on the existing market capitalisation of HK$50.5 billion, CKI is now the 13th largest listed 
company in Hong Kong. CKI has already became a new constituent stock of the benchmark Hang 
Seng Index one year after the initial listing and Mr Victor Li Tzar-Kuoi, aged 32 (son of tycoon Mr Li 
Ka-shing) has subsequently tumed out t( be the youngest CEO among the 33 constituent stocks. Spin-
off was the crucial s(ep in this fast growing proc ss of CKI . Being the major shareholders of the 
CKI , C K H also benefit from the whole deal. As ihe degree of information asymmetry was relieved 
directly by the spin-off of CK1, CKH's share price started to outp」-form both the Hang Seng Property 
Subindex and the broadly based Hang Seng li icx. Besides, our g!oup also observes that there are 
some other managerial incentives for this deal. Foj instance, this spin-off redi -ect the CKI's fliture 
funding demand on CKH and it also provided an one-off extraordinary profit for CKH. 
However, the IPO price of CKl seemed to be too demanding and CKI's share, price subsequently 
underperformed the other newly listed red chips in that period . In fact, setting tlie initial offering 
price is not a easy task given so many unpredicable variables. Thus, both scholars and market 
practioners should pay more attention on this topic. 
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APPENDIX I 
ANALYSIS OF SPIN-OFFS 
When performing analysis on spin-off, it is important to look at the transactions between parent 
and spun-offunit that may affect future profitability or cash flow. Possible problem areas include: 
1. The treatment of inter-company loan after spin-off e.g. loan capitalisation or repayment 
2. Examine income tax sharing agreements, which detail the impact of additional tax assessments or 
refunds covering periods prior to the spin-off. Also consider that the spun-off unit inherits the tax 
basis as well as the accounting basis of assets and liabilities. If tax depreciation of fixed assets has 
exceeded depreciation expense, then future tax deductions will be below depreciation expense. 
Although the deferred tax liability in the balance sheet should provide for the reversal ofthis and other 
timing differences, there may still be a cash flow consequence if income taxes paid exceed fiiture 
income tax expense. 
3. How have post retirement benefits .een dealt with? Ifthe parent c ompany retains responsibility foi all 
benefits for retirees, for example, lhe spun-off will have a reduced burden. Also evaluate tlie 
allocation ofpension p\in assets and liabilities. 
4. Contingent liability for debt or other obligations ofthe paiciit company. 
5. Guarantees of spin-off obligations by the parent, but with the spun off unit paying a fee for tl'.e 
guarantee. 
6. Parent company charges for administrative or other services. 
a) Higher rental costs due to spun-off unit occupancy of parent company office space or operating 
facilities. 
b) Inter-companies supply agreements, which can be either positive or negative for the spun-off unit, 
depending on their terms. Such agreements often have provisions providing for termination or 
diminishment over time. 
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Spin-off gives a diversified company the opportunity to expand its own shareholder value by 
exposing a stellar subsidiary for a pure-play valuation by the public securities markets. After market 
movement depends on the operating performance of the spun-off unit and investor appetite for firms in 
specific industries. Although some investors immediately sell the shares of spin-offs they receive, others 
find spin-offs to be attractive investment opportunities. The following factors may make spin-offs 
profitable investments: 
1. Operations that are "lost" in a large corporation may benefit from the focus of a management 
undistracted by other activities. Spun-off unit frequently provides stock options and other incentives 
for managers to improve profitability. 
2. The smaller size of a spin-off may increase the flexibility of managers no longer bound by the 
bureaucracy of the former parent. 
3. The spin-off may attract investors who wish to invest in its industry, but were deterred by the other 
operations of the former parent. The spin-off may also attract customers not previously accessible 
because they are competitors ofthe parent. 
4. Even if the spun-off company has poor current profitability, investors may be attracted by high book 
value, casb ^ow, or other attributes. 
In practice, a spin-off may increase shareholder wealth as the combined market value ofthe spin-
off and parent company shares exceeds the pre-spin-off market value of the parent. Operations that 
contributed little or nothing to the parent company's market value (because of low profitability, or lack of 
visibility) may have substantial market value as a stand-alone company. The superior performance suggest 
that the company may have increased the value of its shares by "giving away" part of its operations. 
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APPENDIX II 
BUSINESSES & HIGHLIGHTS OF CKI 
1. Business profile 
Incorporated in May 1996, CKI acquired from its parent company CKH its interests in the 
road and power businesses in China and GIC and AA in Hong Kong. After the reorganisation, CKI 
will invest in and manage power plants and toll roads and toll bridges and infrastructure-related 
businesses in the manufacture and sale of cement, the production and delivery of concrete, the 
production and laying ofasphalt and the quarrying and selling of aggregates in Hong Kong and China. 
2. Management team 
The management of the Company is essentially the same as CKH, who are highly regarded 
for their vision and business skills. Mr. Victor Li, the elder son of Mr. Li Ka-shing, is the Chairman 
and Mr. Kam Hing-lam is the Managing Director. They are both Deputy Managing Director o fC^H . 
3. Major line of businesses 
c) Power plants 
CKI has interests in six power plants in the Guangdong province wilit an aggregate 
design capacity of2,200 MW. The largest power plant is the Zhuhai power plant phase i, which 
is a 2x700 MW coal-fired electrical power plant. CK1 has a 45 per cent interest in plant, which is 
expected to be completed by July 1999. 
In Nanhai, CKI has interests in two power plants, namely Nanhai Jiangnani power plant 
and Nanhai power plant I. The former one is an existing 121 MW power plant, which came into 
operation between 1987 and 1992. CKI's joint-venture formally assumed operation and 
ownership ofthe power plant on January 1, 1995 and CKI is entitled to 10 per cent retum on its 
investment. The latter one is a 400 MW (2x200 MW) oil-fired power plant currently under 
construction. The first generator is expected to be completed in December 1996’ the second unit 
to be by February 1997. CKI is entitled to 20 per cent retum on its investment. In Shantou, CK1 
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has interests in three small-scale power plants with aggregate power generation capacity of 279 
M W and is entitled to 10% retum on its investment. 
In general, these joint-venture contracts provide guarantees on minimum quantities of 
electricity off-take, which will thus safeguard retum on investment by CKI. 
d) Toll roads and bridges 
CKI has interests in three roll roads and ten toll bridges in Shantou and Nanhai. The 
Shantou Bay bridge (SSB) and Shenzhen-Shantou Highway (Eastem Section) (SSHE) form a 
section of an eastern coastal corridor linking up Shenzhen and Shantou. The 11.33 km SSB is 
made up of a dual 3-lane bridges of 2.5 km in the south and a dual 2-lane approach road of 
2.23 km in the south and a dual 2-lane approach road of 6.6 km in the north. The phase I of 
5.93 km has been completed and became operational on June 30 1996，while phase II of the 
remaining section of the northern approach road is expected to be completed in the first half 
of 1997. Toll rates for phase I range from RMB10 to RMB110 for six vehicle categories. 
SSHE is a 140 km dual 2-lane highway, which is expected to be completed and in 
operation by December31 1996. Toll rate will range from RMB0.225 to RMB2.138 per km 
for five vehicle categories. Together with SSB and the western section, this highway will link 
up Shenzhen and Shantou and cut the traffic time from the existing eight hours to three and a 
halfhours. 
CKI has agreed to acquire interest in 11 roads in Nanhai Municipality. The first 
seven roads have been completed for US210m. CKI expects to acquire a 49 per cent interest 
for US$103m. The remaining four roads are expected to be completed by January 1999 for 
total project cost ofUS$120m. CKI will acquire a 64 per cent interest for US$77m. 
e) Financing and distribution of profit 
For joint-venture projects in China, the parties are generally required to contribute 
registered capital not less than one-third of its total investment. However, for the toll road 
projects, CKI and its partners are allowed to provide registered capital of only 10 per cent of 
its total investment, but the shortfalls are usually more than compensated for shareholders' 
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loans. Fixed assets are usually depreciated over a minimum period of variable years without 
residual value and the depreciation charges are used to repay registered capital. 
Revenue are firstly used for the payment of operating expenses, taxes, the three 
statutory funds and then to the repayment of principal of the shareholders loan and interest. 
After-tax net profits are distributed to the joint-venture parties in accordance with the ratio of 
their registered capital, 
f) Cement and Concrete 
Through its two principal subsidiaries, GI and AA, CKI plays a leading role in Hong 
Kong construction material market. It produces and sells cement, concrete, asphalt and 
aggregates. The former two products account for the majority of its sales and profit. 
GI is the only integrated cement manufacturer in Hong Kong, supplying almost halt 
of the Hong Kong market. Its cement factory at Tap Shek Kok, Tuen Mun has a k i b capacity 
of approx. 2.5m tonnes per year. Ordinary portland cement accounts for about 70 per cent of 
its production with blended cement, making up llie remainiiig 30 per cent. 
AA operates 19 concrete batching plants, which have an annual concrete production 
capacity of approx. 4 m.c.m. In China, t. A has interests in Uv(、batching plants located in 
Zhuhai and Guangzhou, which have production capacities of 300k c. m. and 400k c.m., 
respectively. AA operates two asphalt production plants in Lam Tei, Tuen Mun and Tai of 
370k tonnes and 450k tonnes, respectively. AA has a quarry site at Lam Tei under a 
government contract, which can produce approx. 2m tonnes of aggregate per annum. The 
existing contract expires in June 1999，at which time AA plans to negotiate with the Hong 
Kong SAR Government for a new contract. 
4. IPO key issue statistics 
New issue 342.3m new share 
Offer price HK$12.65 per share 
Issued shares 1,323.8m shares 
Total net proceeds HK$4.33 billion 
Market capitalisation HK$16.8 billion 
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5. IPO expected timetable 
"implication closes 12noon, July 9,1996 
Announcement of allotment July 12, 1996 
Refund cheques posted July 15, 1996 
"bealings commence July 17, 1996 
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APPENDIX IV 
LEGAL ASPECT OF SPIN-OFF 
Recently, there have been an increasing number of spin-off proposals received by the Stock 
Exchange of Hong Kong Limited ("SEHK") from existing listed companies. In order to ensure that the 
market is safe and sound, the SEHK has issued a Practice Note to maintain the consistency of treatment of 
the spin-off proposals from existing listed issuers and to set out the SEHK's policy with regard to those 
proposals. The Practice Note takes effect from 12th May 1997 and with the following details: 
1. No spun-off by the parent within 3 years of initial listing. 
2. There should be cli - commercial benefits in the spin-off both to the parent and the new spun-off 
unit. 
3. There should be no adverse effect on the shareholders of the parent resulting from the spin-off. 
4. There should be a clear separation between the business retained by the parent and the business of 
the new spun-off unit. 
5. The remaining business of the parent would retain a sufficient level of operations and sufficient 
assets to support its own listing status. 
6. The new spun-off unit should be able to function independently of the parent with regards to its 
business and operations, independence of directorship and management, independence of 
administrative capacity. The on-going and future connected transactions between the parent and 
the new spun-off unit would be properly transacted to safeguard the minorities' interests of both 
units. 
7. The existing shareholders of the parent will be given the assured entitlement to share in the spun-
offunil unless it is waived by the minority shareholders by resolution in general meeting. 
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8. The parent should circulate to its shareholders a circular providing full details of the spun-off and 
its effect on the parent, which would include the advice from independent financial advisers who 
may not be the sponsor or co-sponsor or an underwriter of the new spun-off unit. If there were a 
significant minority opposition, the independent financial advisors would need to submit a report 
to the SEHK as to the discussions at the relevant general meeting. 
9. The latest time at which a formal announcement should be made is the time of lodgement ofthe 
Form A1 or its equivalent. 
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APPENDIX V 
HISTORY OF CKH 
Year Events 
1971 ~" Incorporated in June under the name of ‘Cheung Kong Real Estate Co. Ltd’ 
1972 Adopted its present name prior to offering 10.5m shares to the public in November 
1977 Developed Elizabeth House and the Lockhart House 
1979 Acquired 22.4 per cent of HWL and 25 per cent of Green Island Cement Ltd 
1980 International City Holdings was formed as ajoint venture with HWL 
1 9 9 3 ~ Actively participated as minority interests in consortia led by the PRC interests. 
CKH also involved in infrastructure, comprising bridge, highway and power station projects as 
well as property development activity in Southern China. 
Teamed up with CITIC Pacific to make an unsuccessful take-over bid for listed Miramar Hotel 
& Inv. Co Ltd 
1994 Issued US$350M exchangeable guaranteed floating rate notes, raising ftinds to fmance the 
Group's property, hotel and infrastructure projects in China. 
1996 CKI which holds the group's interests in infrastructure and infrastructure-related businesses in 
HK and China was separately listed in July. CKH retained 70.66 per cent interest in CKI after 
the listing. 
1997 Underwent a group reorganisation, pursuant to which, CKH, 70.66 per cent interest in CKI was 
transferred to HWL, which transferred 35.01 per cent interest in HKE to CKI. As a result, HWL 
became the holding company ofthe group's infrastructure business. 
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